Tradition, Authority and Dialogue: Arendt and Alexander on Education by Snir, Itay
21Foro de Educación, v. 16, n. 24, enero-junio / january-june 2018, pp. 21-40.
e-ISSN: 1698-7802
Tradition, authority and dialogue: 
Arendt and Alexander on education
Itay Snir
e-mail: itaysnir@gmail.com
University of Haifa. Israel
Abstract: In this paper I discuss two attempts to challenge mainstream liberal education, by 
Hannah Arendt and by contemporary Israeli philosopher Hanan Alexander. Arendt and Alexander 
both identify problems in liberal-secular modern politics and present alternatives based on 
reconnecting politics and education to tradition. I analyze their positions and bring them into a 
dialogue that suggests a complex conception of education that avoids many of the pitfalls of modern 
liberal thought. First, I outline Arendt and Alexander’s educational views and discuss their similarities, 
arguing that both may be understood as opposed to the modern attempt to adopt a «view from 
nowhere» at the world. Next, I suggest that Alexander’s view may benefit from adopting Arendt’s 
conceptions of tradition and authority. In the consecutive section, I argue that Alexander sheds light 
on significant problems in Arendt’s approach to education, problems his understanding of critical 
dialogue can help solve. The succeeding section joins the two views together to form an approach 
I call «critical traditionalism», and examines it against prevailing approaches to political education. 
I conclude by pointing to an important point overlooked by both Arendt and Alexander, namely the 
need for internal political struggle within each tradition.
Keywords: Hannah Arendt; Hanan A. Alexander; tradition; authority; dialogue; critique
Recibido / Received: 09/02/2017
Aceptado / Accepted: 10/09/2017
1. Introduction
We live in uncertain and confusing times, both in terms of politics and in terms 
of philosophical reflection on political reality. The very foundations upon which post- 
World War II politics has rested, at least in liberal democratic states, seem to have 
been unsettled by waves of immigration, refugee crises, economic slumps, etc. 
Uncertainty and confusion are also apparent in education: in addition to the growing 
concern in many democratic countries regarding student achievements and school’s 
ability to prepare them for civic life, many of the presuppositions upon which modern 
liberal education relies have lost their self-evidence; these include rationality, the 
neutrality of government, and educating for personal autonomy. Various aspects of 
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contemporary reality, from multiculturalism to the new spirituality, call for rethinking 
liberal education.
In this paper, I discuss two attempts to challenge mainstream liberal education, 
by Hannah Arendt in the late 1950s, and by contemporary Israeli philosopher Hanan 
Alexander. I analyze their positions and bring them into a dialogue that suggests a 
more complex conception of education that avoids many of the pitfalls of modern 
liberal thought.
Arendt and Alexander are not the perfect match. There are many differences 
between the 20th-century non-observant Jew who arrived at the US as a refugee and 
oscillated between Zionism and anti-Zionism, and the contemporary conservative 
rabbi who emigrated from the US to Israel out of commitment to Zionism. While 
Arendt was educated in German-European philosophy and after moving to the US 
developed an unorthodox, non-liberal political philosophy, Alexander was educated 
in California as an analytic philosopher and his writings on the philosophy of 
education, theology and spirituality are anchored in the Anglo-American tradition. 
Despite the distance in time, space and philosophical orientation, however, the two 
have much in common. Both are Jewish immigrants who have spent much of their 
lives in the United States, and for each both Judaism and the American context are 
important not only biographically but also intellectually. More importantly, they both 
identify problems in liberal-secular modern politics and present alternatives based 
on reconnecting politics and education to tradition. This paper brings them together 
not to gloss over or downplay the obvious differences between them, but rather 
to claim that the congruence between their views is significant enough to allow a 
constructive discussion. The dialogue between their views will not only demonstrate 
their affinity but also enable each to provide answers to problems and lacunae found 
in the other. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. First, I outline Arendt and 
Alexander’s educational views and discuss their similarities, arguing that both may 
be understood as opposed to the modern attempt to adopt a «view from nowhere» 
at the world. Next, I suggest that Alexander’s view may benefit from adopting 
Arendt’s conceptions of tradition and authority. In the consecutive section, I argue 
that Alexander sheds light on significant problems in Arendt’s approach to education, 
problems his understanding of critical dialogue can help solve. The succeeding 
section joins the two views together to form an approach I call «critical traditionalism», 
and examines it against prevailing approaches to political education. I conclude by 
pointing to an important point overlooked by both Arendt and Alexander, namely the 
need for internal political struggle within each tradition. 
2. No view from nowhere
At first glance, Arendt and Alexander do not share the same adversary in the 
field of education: she aims her arrows mainly at progressive education that places 
the child at the center of the educational process, while he is troubled primarily 
with liberal education, which puts abstract reason at its core. Nevertheless, a closer 
look reveals significant similarities between both their educational views and the 
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approaches they attack, for both scholars attack them for adopting a kind of «view 
from nowhere» to education.
Arendt wrote little about education (Higgins, 2010). Her rich corpus on political 
theory, philosophy and history contains only two texts dedicated to educational issues, 
both from the late 1950s: «Reflections on Little Rock» (2005c [hereafter RLR]), 
which drew fierce fire for opposing federal enforcement of school desegregation in 
Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957; and «The Crisis in Education» (2006c [hereafter CE]), 
based on a 1958 lecture, in which she developed the connections between her views 
on politics and education. 
Central to Arendt’s two discussions of education is the demand to separate 
politics from education. In spite of her call to reject the traditional hierarchy placing 
vita contemplativa above vita activa and restore the central place political activity had 
in antiquity, Arendt objects to political education. She is opposed to bringing politics 
to education – as in Little Rock, where adults have imposed the struggle against 
racial discrimination on schoolchildren. She is also opposed to bringing education 
to politics – as in totalitarian regimes, which tried to «reeducate» dissenting citizens. 
While politics, according to Arendt, consists of appearing in the public realm, 
exposing oneself to peer judgment, the educational situation is inherently unequal: 
when attempting to act politically by educational means, she writes, «instead of 
joining with one’s equals in assuming the effort of persuasion and running the risk 
of failure, there is dictatorial intervention, based upon the absolute superiority of the 
adult» (CE, p. 176).
The approach conceiving of education in political terms is most evident, 
according to Arendt, in the «progressive education» prevalent in the US in the first 
half of the 20th century, whose arguably destructive outcomes led to the crisis she 
discusses1. This education rests, in her view, on three interrelated assumptions: that 
the world of children is autonomous; that pedagogy is a science more important 
than the subject matter taught; and that learning should be replaced with hands-on 
skill acquisition (CE, pp. 180-183). All three assumptions reflect the collapse of the 
distinction between education and politics, as well as that between children and 
adults. The first conceives of children in terms suitable to the public world of equals, 
while the second and third conceive of teaching and learning, respectively, in terms 
suitable for doing, namely for making things. That is to say, instead of gradually 
acquainting the child with the world of adults through an educative encounter with 
a teacher who is familiar with that world, progressive education throws her to the 
public eye of her peers in an autonomous children’s world, as if she is ready to 
handle the pressure involved, and conversely turns learning into a play-like activity 
most suitable for infants. 
The crisis resulting from what Arendt views as the inevitable collapse of 
progressive education is also an opportunity, in that it opens the possibility to see the 
essential core of education through the multiple layers of history and prejudices. This 
1  Arendt does not specify what she means by «that complex of modem educational theories 
which originated in Middle Europe» (CE, p. 178), but she most likely has in mind ideas that originate 
with European educationalists such as Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (2007) and his disciple Friedrich 
Fröbel (2005), and arrived to the US with the writings of John Dewey (1997). 
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essence, for Arendt, is natality: «education belongs among the most elementary and 
necessary activities of human society, which never remains as it is but continuously 
renews itself through birth, through the arrival of new human beings» (CE, p. 185). 
The birth of a human child calls for education because the child does not only 
«become», like any other animal, but is also new to the world: 
The child shares the state of becoming with all living things; in respect to life 
and its development, the child is a human being in process of becoming, just as 
a kitten is a cat in process of becoming. But the child is new only in relation to a 
world that was there before him, that will continue after his death, and in which 
he is to spend his life. If the child were not a newcomer in this human world but 
simply a not yet finished living creature, education would be just a function of 
life and would need to consist in nothing save that concern for the sustenance 
of life and that training and practice in living that all animals assume in respect 
to their young (CE, p. 185).
The world, therefore, is the necessary complementary, the backdrop against 
which human natality takes place and has meaning (Levinson, 2001, p. 13). This 
world, to be sure, is not the natural reality humans share with all living things, but 
rather the artificial world they make when they engage in the activity of work – as 
opposed to labor, which is the production of consumable things needed for biological 
existence, and to speech and action in front of others (Arendt, 1998 [hereafter HC], 
p. 7). 
The role of schools, in this approach, is to mediate between the child and the 
world: it must protect the child from the dangers and pressures of the world, and at 
the same time protect the world from the newness inherent in every child (CE, pp. 
188-189). Teachers, for their part, stand in front of their students as representatives 
of the world, and their primary task is to take responsibility for the world regardless 
of any criticism they may have of it: «responsibility is not arbitrarily imposed upon 
educators; it is implicit in the fact that the young are introduced by adults into a 
continuously changing world. Anyone who refuses to assume joint responsibility for 
the world should not have children and must not be allowed to take part in educating 
them» (CE, p. 189). Assuming this responsibility, Arendt continues, is the source of 
the teacher’s authority, rather than theoretical knowledge or the ability to punish; 
it «rests on his assumption of responsibility for that world. Vis-à-vis the child it is 
as though he were a representative of all adult inhabitants, pointing out the details 
and saying to the child: This is our world» (CE, p. 189). That is to say, educational 
authority rests not only on acquaintance with the world but also on the teacher taking 
place in it, being part of it and of the chain of generations constituting it: «it is his task 
to mediate between the old and the new, so that his very profession requires of him 
an extraordinary respect for the past» (CE, p. 193).
This is clearly a conservative approach to education, but Arendt argues that this 
conservatism is aimed not at conserving the world as it is but rather at renewing it 
(Gordon, 2001, p. 37): it recognizes that one should be acquainted with the world 
and become part of it before acting in it. Conservative education is needed to allow 
children to grow into adults who do not treat the world conservatively: «Exactly 
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for the sake of what is new and revolutionary in every child, education must be 
conservative; it must preserve this newness and introduce it as a new thing into 
an old world, which, however revolutionary its actions may be, is always, from the 
standpoint of the next generation, superannuated and close to destruction» (CE, pp. 
192-193). The consequences of teachers’ inability to identify with tradition and take 
responsibility over the world, therefore, reach far beyond the educational domain, for 
it hinders the historical process in which it is being renewed and updated to keep up 
with a changing world. 
However, the crisis in education not only contributes to the demise of tradition 
and culture, it is first and foremost a reflection of this demise. This demise, Arendt 
claims, is «a symptom of that modern estrangement from the world which can be seen 
everywhere but which presents itself in especially radical and desperate form under 
the conditions of a mass society» (CE, p. 191). World estrangement or alienation, 
as Arendt argues in her most important philosophical book, The Human Condition 
(published in 1958, about the same time as the two papers on education), is «the 
hallmark of the modern age» (HC, p. 254). It is a companion to modern thought 
and science, which are characterized by not settling for what appears to the eyes 
of earth-bound man, and attempting to replace it with an external, «Archimedean» 
point of view from which to look down at the earth and discover its secrets. The 
desire for such an Archimedean perspective can be traced back to Copernicus, 
whose bold imagination «lifted him from the earth and enabled him to look down 
upon her as though he actually were an inhabitant of the sun» (HC, p. 259), and 
is most evident in Galileo, who used the telescope to «consider the nature of the 
earth from the viewpoint of the universe» (HC, p. 248). As a result, «All laws of 
the new astrophysical science are formulated from the Archimedean point, and this 
point probably lies much farther away from the earth and exerts much more power 
over her than Archimedes or Galileo ever dared to think» (HC, p. 263). In short, 
the modern attempt to look at the world from nowhere has led to world alienation, 
which is expressed in the refusal to take responsibility for it and to crises in authority, 
tradition and education. 
Hanan Alexander also claims that the modern view from nowhere leads to a 
problem in contemporary educational theory. His frame of reference does not reach 
back to the dawn of the modern age, but rather to the «methodology wars» of 
the 20th century (2015 [hereafter RLE], p. 40). The two sides fighting these wars 
in the field of social sciences, according to Alexander’s account, were positivism, 
which originated in the natural sciences, and constructivism, which originated in 
philosophical phenomenology (Popper, 1992; Husserl, 1977). While the former seeks 
objective knowledge based on generalizations of empirical data, the latter appeals 
to conscious thoughts and experiences and suspends all judgment regarding the 
existence of reality outside consciousness (RLE, p. 45). While positivism believes in 
what Thomas Nagel (1986) called «the view from nowhere», a view purged of bias or 
contingency, constructivism acknowledges only the validity of an introspective view, 
renouncing all attempt to look at the world in itself. The clash between these two 
approaches eventually les to what Alexander calls «the dual epistemology thesis» 
(RLE, p. 39) according to which the two research orientations should be allowed 
to coexist in order to understand reality in a more complex way than any of them 
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would have allowed in itself. But both, argues Alexander, are highly problematic: 
introspective constructivism «leaves the subject alone in her own solipsistic universe» 
(RLE, p. 45), and in denying any ideals independent of consciousness leads even to 
narcissism and nihilism; positivism, on the other hand, puts its faith in an objective 
view from nowhere, but cannot escape the need to judge and decide which facts and 
data are relevant, and the consequent fact that «scientific research programs may 
vary according to the judgments of distinct knowing subjects» (RLE, p. 45).
Rather than opening up the field of research, the dual epistemology thesis limits 
it to two dichotomous options and under the veil of pluralism excludes any possible 
third way. Alexander’s alternative «requires admitting the possibility of a view from 
somewhere, even if we cannot come to agreement concerning where that view is 
from or what vantage point it allows» (RLE, p. 40). Following the epistemological 
views of philosophers from the more conservative end of contemporary liberalism 
such as Alasdair MacIntyre (2007), Charles Taylor (1992) and Michael Sandel (1998), 
Alexander argues that a view from somewhere cannot be objective and neutral, but 
does not settle for subjectivist relativism either. The place from which we look is 
never personal or arbitrary, but rather anchored in a rich intersubjective, communal 
sphere – it stems from a tradition in which one lives, which provides the first context 
from which one can look. As opposed to the disengagement from the world implied 
in both the view from nowhere and introspection, the view from somewhere stands 
firm on the ground of this world. Nevertheless, it is not limited to the actual «world 
of appearances», not hopelessly tied to the given. To be able to evaluate, judge and 
apply standards, the tradition from which one looks at the world must be saturated 
with values and normative meanings, namely with some conception of the good, 
although this good cannot enjoy the status of an objective, absolute truth: 
Knowledge – at least in education – is always the possession of an 
embodied agent, constrained by language, culture, and history, who grasps, 
albeit imperfectly, the contours of an entity or the meaning of an idea that 
transcends – exists independently or outside of – his or her limited experience. 
And this requires – as a regulative principle – the existence of ideals beyond our 
own conceptualized experience, whose ultimate content remains shrouded in 
culture, history, language and tradition (RLE, p. 48). 
To be sure, aspiring for transcendental good does not mean an attempt to 
reach an objective godlike position, but rather awareness of the fact that historical 
man is always in relation to some transcendent values different from the mundane 
world and cannot be positively known. A basic insight cutting through the whole of 
Alexander’s work is that man cannot step outside of the life he lives and the world 
he lives in (RLE, p. 9) – the scholar, just as the teacher and the student, is always 
conditioned by her specific place in the world and even transgression, critique and 
transformation are necessarily related to it. Put differently, the view from nowhere is 
in fact impossible, while the view from somewhere is at the same time fact and value, 
a given condition and one teachers and scholars need not attempt to transcend. 
We can see that despite the considerable differences between Arendt and 
Alexander, the similarities between their views are also significant: they both insist 
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on going against the modern current and call for a reconnection of education and 
tradition. Rejecting the Archimedean view from nowhere, they both realize an 
educational view must be of this world, and that giving children a future in the world 
requires putting them in touch with the rich past, which gives the world depth and 
meaning. Arendt’s words regarding the conception of authority she adopts from the 
Romans could have been written, I believe, also by Alexander: tradition, she writes, 
is «the guiding thread through the past and the chain to which each new generation 
knowingly or unknowingly was bound in its understanding of the world and its own 
experience» (RLE, p. 25). I turn now to examining how the differences between the 
two positions make the dialogue between them an opportunity for mutual learning. 
3. Political tradition and authority
Alexander (2001) takes modern liberalism to be a political success and a moral 
failure: it succeeded in bringing a multiplicity of cultures, beliefs and ways of life to 
coexist in a single political sphere, but this led to the secularization and neutralization 
of the public sphere, and consequently to the inability of liberal society to provide 
existential meaning to the lives of men and women. In the educational context, 
liberal society is unable to answer questions such as how we should educate our 
children and where we can we can find the legitimacy to teach them one way of life 
rather than another. Proper answers, Alexander argues, require accepting tradition 
in a way that can give life meaning and at the same time be a source of authority 
without imposing itself and without shattering the political framework common to a 
plurality of traditions. 
Despite the persuasiveness of his arguments, I think Alexander’s concepts of 
tradition and authority are not fully developed. His conception of authority is elaborated 
through what he calls «a vision of good life», namely the answer given to the classic 
question of how one should live (RLE, p. 98). Such a vision, based on moral values 
and social norms, is not personal but rather collective, anchored in a community 
with a long history of living together and giving meaning to a common world (RLE, 
p. 99). The kind of tradition Alexander advocates is holistic but not totalistic (that is, 
provides a comprehensive worldview without limiting it to a single interpretation),  as 
well as dynamic and pragmatic rather than dogmatic and monolithic (see also Dorff, 
1996). This means that although the vision of the good life is not personal, it should 
leave room for a variety of ways in which members of the community interpret the 
vision they share and practice their tradition. This is clearly an inclusive conception 
of tradition, which is not limited to religious traditions like the Jewish one but applies 
also to national, cultural and philosophical ones (Alexander mentions, for example, 
the Aristotelian philosophical tradition [RLE, p. 103]). 
However, I think that there are two major problems with this conception of 
tradition. First, Alexander does not provide a satisfactory account of how tradition 
is transmitted from one generation to the next, as well as of how it passes from 
the theoretical level of knowledge and belief to the practical one, which gives life 
order and meaning. Second, his conception of tradition lacks an important political 
dimension, in that it does not account for how tradition compels some people to obey 
others and accept their authority. Although he is deeply rooted in the communitarian 
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political tradition of MacIntyre, Taylor and Sandel, Alexander’s conception of authority 
focuses on each individual’s authority to make her own decisions, but refrains from 
discussing the origin and legitimation of one individual’s authority over another. 
Thus, although he comments that «What accounts for the identity of a tradition is 
the diffusion of authority between past, present, and future, in which nothing that 
ever belonged is completely lost» (RLE, p. 119), nowhere does he make the relation 
between tradition and authority the center of discussion. Consequently, he is silent 
regarding the ways tradition gives power to some over others and the role authority 
plays in passing tradition onwards.
Arendt, on the other hand, dedicates considerable attention to conceptualizing 
both tradition and authority. Despite her Jewish descent, she does not draw these 
concepts from the monotheistic context, but rather from the Roman one – a context 
in which tradition and authority are tightly connected to religion yet are importantly 
distinct from it as well as from each other. The Roman trinity of tradition, religion 
and authority, Arendt argues, is decisive for Western history, and has influenced 
the meanings of these concepts in Judaism and Christianity as well. Elaborating 
Arendt’s concepts of tradition and authority therefore enables a better understanding 
of the educational position outlined in her two essays on education, and helps add 
substance to these concepts in Alexander, providing him with more historical depth 
and theoretical width. Since Alexander convincingly shows that the shaking off of 
tradition by liberal educational discourse is problematic, Arendt’s thorough discussion 
of tradition and its relations to authority will strengthen his position and contribute to 
its contemporary relevance.
Tradition, according to Arendt, is not simply continuation or a relation with the 
past, and the kind of tradition which originated in republican Rome and declined 
in the modern age is by no means identical to the one we find in cultures we often 
refer to as «traditional» (Arendt, 2005 [hereafter TPT], p. 54). There is a specific 
Western tradition for thinking of tradition – a tradition with a definite beginning and 
end, leaving the present without the special type of relation to the past it used to 
make possible. The most important function of tradition is «to give answers to all 
questions by channeling them into predetermined categories» (TPT, p. 55). That is 
to say, tradition has an inherent pretention to be all-encompassing, and this task is 
both made possible and limited by the conceptual tools available to it. Traditional 
categories are clearly manifested in language, in the vocabulary people use to 
interpret their world and communicate about it, but the linguistic dimension of human 
interaction does not exhaust them.
Tradition mediates our very experience of the world, including the meanings we 
give to our immediate feelings and perceptions. Arendt calls the thick array through 
which we feel and perceive our shared world «common sense»: 
It lies in the nature of a tradition to be accepted and absorbed, as it were, 
by common sense, which fits the particular and idiosyncratic data of our other 
senses into a world we inhabit together and share in common. In this general 
understanding, common sense indicates that in the human condition of plurality 
men check and control their particular sense data against the common data of 
others (TPT, p. 41). 
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Common sense provides shared criteria for making sense of the world and for 
speaking and acting in it in ways that make sense to others – it is thus a crucial 
condition for political action. To be sure, common sense is neither universal nor 
natural but specific to culture, to people sharing a human world. But common sense 
not only connects each member of the community to the others, it also connects 
them to their ancestors, preserving the past in the present by determining what 
aspects of the past are still relevant: 
The tradition-bound judgments of common sense extracted and saved from 
the past whatever was conceptualized by tradition and was still applicable to 
present conditions. This ‘practical’ commonsense method of remembrance did 
not require any effort but was imparted to us, in a common world, as our shared 
inheritance (TPT, p. 42). 
Arendt is not tired of saying that this understanding of tradition and of the role 
of common sense in carrying it forwards is based on Roman political experience. 
Much different from that of the Greeks, in this experience «political action consists 
in the foundation and preservation of a civitas» (p. 47). The whole of Roman history 
and politics relies on maintaining a connection with the great act of foundation and 
making sure this act and the actors responsible for it will forever be part of the 
political body they have founded. The qualities of greatness and eternity bestowed 
upon the act of foundation and the founders, and through them on the city and 
political community, have a religious nature: 
This sanctification of the gigantic, almost superhuman, and therefore 
[…] legendary effort of foundation […] became the cornerstone of the Roman 
religion, in which political and religious activity were considered to be one… This 
Roman religion, based on foundation, made it a holy duty to preserve whatever 
had been handed down from the ancestors, the maiores or greater ones (TPT, 
p. 49). 
Through religion, tradition can preserve not only the memory of foundation but 
also its binding power, its influence on the way of life of all succeeding generations, 
namely ancestral authority: tradition, Arendt writes, preserved authority, «which was 
based on the testimony of the ancestors who had witnessed the sacred foundation» 
(TPT, pp. 49-50). 
Authority, in other words, stems directly from the founding fathers – it is integral 
to what keeps the city together throughout the generations and makes the common 
political existence of its citizens possible. Hence, a regime based on such authority 
is by no means tyrannical or capricious: «The difference between tyranny and 
authoritarian government has always been that the tyrant rules in accordance with 
his own will and interest, whereas even the most draconic authoritarian government 
is bound by laws» (Arendt, 2006b [hereafter WA], p. 97). The root of the difference 
lies in that «The source of authority in authoritarian government is always a force 
external and superior to its own power» (WA, p. 97). Hence, while authority is often 
confused with power, strength or violence since they are all designed to make others 
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obey, Arendt insists that «authority precludes the use of external means of coercion; 
where force is used, authority itself has failed» (WA, p. 93). And although authority 
implies unequal relations between people, it does not involve oppression: «Authority 
implies an obedience in which men retain their freedom» (WA, p. 106). When the 
past event of foundation has been sanctified and transmitted through tradition, the 
authority of the ancestors is present in citizens’ lives, enabling rather than impinging 
upon their political freedom. 
This trinity of tradition, religion and authority was strong enough to survive 
the transitions from republic to empire and from paganism to Christianity, the latter 
through the founding of the Roman-Catholic church on the writings and heritage of 
the church fathers (TPT, p. 50). However, all three mutually dependent elements 
declined at the beginning of the modern age as the belief in the sanctity of foundation 
was replaced by the belief in future progress (TPT, p. 50). The loss of traditional 
tools of understanding and judgment, accompanied by the weakening of religion 
and authority, brought upon the demise of common sense itself – not of a specific 
common sense, replaced by another, but of the very possibility for making sense 
in common (Snir, 2015). This led to «an atrophy in the dimension of the past and 
initiated the creeping and irresistible movement of shallowness which spreads a veil 
of meaninglessness over all spheres of modern life» (TPT, p. 42).
We can now return to the crisis in education, whose origin Arendt locates in the 
gap between the modern world and the inherent need for authority and tradition in 
education: 
The problem of education in the modern world lies in the fact that by its 
very nature it cannot forgo either authority or tradition, and yet must proceed 
in a world that is neither structured by authority nor held together by tradition. 
That means, however, that not just teachers and educators, but all of us, insofar 
as we live in one world together with our children and with young people, must 
take toward them an attitude radically different from the one we take toward one 
another. We must decisively divorce the realm of education from the others, 
most of all from the realm of public, political life, in order to apply to it alone a 
concept of authority and an attitude toward the past which are appropriate to it 
but have no general validity and must not claim a general validity in the world of 
grown-ups (CE, p. 195). 
Tradition and authority, therefore, should function in education despite having 
lost their validity in the world of adults. But if educators succeed in this task, and 
students in turn renew the world in a way inspired – not determined – by their 
experience with educational authority, education may be able to become a source 
for renewal and re-instantiation of tradition and authority – which are supportive of 
political freedom – also beyond the school.
Alexander clearly cannot accept the sweeping claim that the modern world 
has lost touch with religion, tradition and ancestral authority – after all, he lives, 
writes and educates within a traditional religious community – but the historical and 
philosophical aspects of the picture Arendt draws can nevertheless be related to his 
view and contribute to its understanding of tradition and authority. First, her concept 
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of common sense sheds light on the modus operandi of what he calls «a view from 
somewhere». Understanding that the lenses through which we look at the world 
are painted with common sense means realizing that looking at the world is tightly 
connected to the way people sense their world and make sense of it together with 
others who share the same world. Second, Arendt’s concepts of tradition and authority 
allow educational theory to flesh out the connection between past and present and 
demonstrate that it contains much more than continuity, belonging and identity. As 
tradition transmits the act of foundation and authority rests with the founding fathers, 
they are not merely historically contingent but constitute the very thing that makes 
living together possible. Such tradition does not limit perspective but rather opens it 
and gives it depth, and such authority is not arbitrary but the very thing that makes 
freedom possible. These points by no means contradict Alexander’s view, but rather 
bring to light implicit and underdeveloped aspects of his thought, thereby adding to 
its relevance.
4. Pluralism, difference and dialogue
In various contexts where she discusses tradition, Arendt writes of «our» tradition 
(2005b; 2006a) and in «The Crisis in Education», she speaks of «the» world, as if 
there are only one relevant tradition and one common world. But she is well aware 
that society is split into groups with their own traditions, religions and authorities. 
Should education ignore this plurality? Arendt thinks not. 
In her essay on Little Rock, Arendt denies government the right to impose 
educational integration and upholds the parents’ right to choose in whose company 
their children will be educated. The backbone of her position is a distinction between 
three domains: the private, the social and the political. The political domain is 
characterized by equality. This equality is manifested nowadays, among other 
things, by equality before the law and the equal right to elect and be elected. This 
is not the case in social and private life, however. Upon entering society, «We 
become subject to the old adage of ‘like attracts like’ which controls the whole 
realm of society [W]ithout discrimination of some sort society would simply cease to 
exist and very important possibilities of free association and group formation would 
disappear» (RLR, p. 205). Discrimination, therefore, is a social right just as equality 
is a political right, and is by no means illegitimate. The third, private domain is ruled 
by exclusiveness – one chooses one’s close friends and intimate partners (RLR, 
p. 207). The political domain, Arendt concludes, must not intervene in the right of 
individuals to make friends and find a marital partner of their own choosing but must 
also refrain from acting in the name of equality against social discrimination. 
To which domain, then, does education belong? «Children», Arendt writes, «are 
first of all part of family and home, and this means that they are, or should be, 
brought up in that atmosphere of idiosyncratic exclusiveness which alone makes 
a home a home» (RLR, p. 211). This entails parental right over the education of 
their children, a right compulsory education limits but does not annul. The right of 
the state concerns «only the content of the child’s education, not the context of 
association and social life which invariably develops out of his attendance at school» 
(RLR, p. 212). The right of parents to decide whom their children will go to school 
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with legitimizes private and separate schools, even segregated ones. As long as 
the schools of the different social groups are equally good, political equality is not 
impinged by social discrimination. Arendt’s claim that education should mediate the 
world to the young through tradition and authority should therefore be understood 
in the context of the right to separate schooling: each of these schools has its own 
tradition, authority, and sometimes religion. 
Arendt’s position in the Little Rock essay is therefore consistent with that 
developed in «The Crisis in Education», and as mentioned overlaps Alexander’s 
on certain points: although he would probably reject her distinction between the 
political, the social and the private domains, he too is an enthusiastic supporter of 
the right of parents to educate their children in separate schools. In the important 
debate between Eamonn Callan and Terence McLaughlin regarding the right to 
separate schooling, Alexander sides with the latter – who claims that «parents are 
justified in fostering a stable and coherent ‘primary culture’, which may be infused 
with religion» (RLE, p. 180) – against the former’s claim that education for rational 
autonomy allows parents only to expose their children to their beliefs but not to 
instill them (Callan, 1985). Much like Arendt, Alexander argues that liberal societies 
«require both common and separate schools in some form or another» (RLR, p. 
171), and that the choice between them should rest with the parents. 
However, Alexander’s approach brings to light at least two problems in Arendt’s. 
First, his question, «Can education in particular religious, ethical, or political traditions 
be distinguished from morally troubling forms of ideological indoctrination…?» 
(RLE, p. 92), may be addressed to Arendt, namely: Does applying the Roman 
model of tradition and authority to education not lead to illegitimate oppression, 
to indoctrination? The connection Arendt makes between authority and freedom 
cannot be a sufficient answer here, for Alexander asks about the initial consent to 
enter into the hierarchical structure and accept the kind of freedom it offers; he asks, 
in other words, about parents’ right to choose traditional and cultural affiliation for 
their children. Second, Alexander argues that although separate schooling based on 
religious or traditional (but not on racial) identity is acceptable, it might still reproduce 
social power relations, and that this potential problem must be addressed. Given that 
not all groups enjoy equal status in the state, we must ask whether separate education 
«excludes from the language of political power others who are not members of that 
[hegemonic] group» (RLE, p. 107). In other words, how can traditional Arendtian 
education be prevented from passing discrimination on to the political domain? 
Alexander’s approach also offers solutions to these two problems. For traditional 
education not to be indoctrination, Alexander argues, the pedagogical relation 
between the student and tradition must not be unidirectional – schools must not 
impose tradition on a passive student, but rather invite her to engage in dialogue 
with tradition. Without such dialogue, genuine absorption of tradition is impossible: 
understanding tradition «requires first that we grasp the purposes and intentions, 
the norms that govern conduct and expression, by entering into a dialogue with 
those who live by them» (RLE, p. 83). That is to say, tradition is not a petrified 
body of facts about the past and guidelines for the present one can look at and 
understand «from the outside»; it must be understood «from within», as a way of 
life, and this requires «living» interaction between teacher and student. Moreover, 
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such dialogue is not limited to becoming acquainted with tradition as it is; the teacher 
should facilitate a critical approach to tradition and allow the students to ask difficult 
questions. As new, original questions often require answers tradition cannot provide, 
educational dialogue can breathe new life into tradition, revise it to fit the changing 
world: «Teaching not only transmits old ideas; it creates new ones. It is associated 
not only with predetermined feelings and norms; it also creates new attitudes and 
practices. Teaching is generative, not merely reproductive. It recalls the past, but it 
also pushes the limits, criticizes, explores, examines» (RLE, p. 61; see also Dorff, 
1996). Tradition is thus party to the educational dialogue and as such, it learns and 
evolves when it is learnt and embraced by the new generation. 
This reveals an important difference between Alexander and Arendt. Not, to be 
sure, in the understanding of tradition as dynamic, for in Arendt too the renewal of 
the world, and with it tradition and common sense, is inherent to living interaction 
with it. Rather, the difference lies in the answer they both give to the question who is 
to renew: for Arendt, only adults, who have been acquainted with tradition and are 
already at home in the world, are prepared to renew the world without placing either 
the world or themselves at risk. According to Alexander, however, the renewal of 
tradition takes place also, perhaps primarily, by the students engaged in educational 
dialogue with it. A claim running throughout Alexander’s writing is that students are 
moral agents, and that this agency must be nurtured from early on, even when it is 
expressed in skepticism and criticism of tradition, authority and religion: 
What conceptions of education must share in common – what makes them 
conceptions of education rather than something else, say indoctrination – is a 
commitment to human agency […] Refining the capacities of human agency […] 
requires learning to understand, apply, interpret, and create norms within the 
context of communities or traditions that render them meaningful (RLE, p. 99).
That is to say, it is impossible to raise children to be moral and political agents 
through education that does not treat them as such and does not encourage them 
to think and act critically; in this sense, the Arendtian separation of education and 
politics is impossible and undesirable. 
Furthermore, Alexander emphasizes that educational dialogue takes place not 
only between the student and tradition (or its representatives), but rather between 
tradition and other traditions. In order to be a living body of beliefs and practices, 
each tradition should be open to others, and genuine traditional education must 
involve exposure to diverse traditional perspectives: «Dialogue and debate among 
contrasting and conflicting views sharpens understanding of one’s own position, 
fosters learning from other perspectives, and promotes the humble recognition that 
competing orientations have many advantages of their own» (RLE, p. 106). The 
resulting approach of «intelligent spirituality» (Alexander, 2001) requires, in terms 
Alexander borrows from Simon Rawidowicz (1957), an interpretation combining both 
exegesis (reading out) and eisegesis (reading in) – both loyalty to what already 
exists in tradition and openness to new readings based on external perspectives 
acquired through resonant intercultural encounters (RLE, p. 172). The plurality of 
beliefs, traditions and cultures is from this perspective not a problem or even a fact 
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to reconcile with, but a necessary condition for the vital, intelligent existence of every 
spiritual tradition (see also Sacks, 2003).
Emphasizing dialogue across traditions and cultures is not only a pedagogical 
and epistemological stance but also a political one, and it enables Alexander to 
formulate an answer to the second problem we pointed to in Arendt, namely the 
danger that education in separate traditions would contribute to the political inequality 
between majority and minority cultures. The challenge pluralism presents to modern 
liberal societies, is «to discern how prevailing traditions can serve as a source of, 
rather than a hindrance to, moral independence and to ensure that relevant rights 
and liberties are not denied to citizens affiliated with minority cultures or those of the 
weak or powerless» (RLE, p. 134). The answer is for societies to «initiate students 
of both majority and minority cultures into ‘dynamic’ versions of the traditions to 
which they are heir. In addition to celebrating their own legacies, dynamic traditions 
are willing to engage opposing perspectives and reinterpret current practice» (RLE, 
p. 134). Intercultural dialogue involves taking a critical stance, essential to liberal-
democratic education within a given tradition, «that addresses power relations both 
within that tradition and between it and other traditions» (RLE, p. 123). 
This position, which Alexander dubs «pedagogy of difference» (RLE, pp. 126-
138; Alexander, 2017), does not rest dialogue on suspicion, looking to uncover power 
relations in order to advance the struggle against oppression as in Paulo Freire (1996). 
It is closer to the hermeneutical approach advocated by Martin Buber (1996) and 
Nel Noddings (2002), attempting to truly understand the Other and build a common 
denominator to bridge over gaps without eliminating them. Such dialogue brings to 
light not only differences but also power relations and hierarchies, and seeks to quell 
them by working together to promote openness, tolerance and willingness to accept 
the other. This dialogue does not presuppose a shared rationality undergirding and 
trivializing any differences, but rather emerges from the differences themselves in 
an attempt to form a common civic ground endowed with both width and depth, from 
which a plurality of groups and individuals can grow and live together side by side.
5. Critical traditionalism
Can Arendt’s approach to tradition and authority be combined with Alexander’s 
pedagogy of difference? I believe it can, if two major problems are overcome. The 
first is the clear hierarchical structure of authority, which is opposed to the mutual, 
egalitarian relations open dialogue implies. Arendt makes clear that authoritarian 
relations are incompatible with persuasion, which «presupposes equality and works 
through a process of argumentation» (WA, p. 93). However, critical dialogue is not 
necessarily deliberative discussion between equals, and does not necessarily entail 
eliminating all hierarchical differences: an open, critical conversation may certainly 
respect all kinds of differences, so that teacher and students can maintain their 
respective roles and positions and still engage in a conversation where students 
ask critical questions rather than merely learn passively. An approach that joins 
Arendt and Alexander together will encourage dialogue between non-equals based 
on common sense, which includes recognition of the obvious differences in authority 
and responsibility between teachers and students; indeed, some may have much 
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more to learn from others, especially the traditional contents, values and rituals of 
the community. 
The second problem is more fundamental to Arendt’s view. It involves her demand 
to divorce education from politics and treat schoolchildren as a-political beings. As 
explained above, this demand is grounded in the need to protect children from the 
dangerous pressure of the public realm, as well as on the claim that one needs to 
be acquainted with the world before being able to act upon, criticize and transform 
it. However, as various scholars (Curtis, 2001; Biesta, 2001; Schutz, 2001; Schutz & 
Sandy, 2015) have already pointed out, this view is untenable. Indeed, even Arendt’s 
own understanding of political activity calls for revising it: political engagement is 
never a miraculous event springing forth ex nihilo; one must practice it gradually. 
Hence, there is room even in Arendt’s view for Alexander’s position that learning 
must involve active engagement with the world, and teachers should encourage 
students to be moral and political agents without thereby exposing them (and the 
world) to excessive danger. School can and should provide the liminal space in 
which students can act without being threatened, criticize without destroying and 
being destroyed – a space in which the distinction between education and politics 
can be reexamined each time anew without utterly collapsing (Snir, 2016). Educators 
in such schools have a double role: on the one hand, to follow Arendt in presenting 
the world to the students and taking responsibility over it as a source for authority 
and legitimate hierarchy; and on the other hand, to follow Alexander in gradually 
providing the students with a secure place from which they can challenge the world, 
including tradition and common sense. School should be safe enough to allow 
teachers and students the confidence to dialogue with other cultures and traditions, 
without thereby undermining the very foundations of their own. I suggest calling this 
approach, which brings Arendt and Alexander together, «critical traditionalism»: it 
combines recognition of the self-evident authority of the teacher with critical approach 
on the part of the student, who is anchored in tradition but also criticizes it from within 
and from without, through dialogue with other traditions. 
The juxtaposition of traditionalism and critique may seem contradictory, for we 
often think of traditionalism as uncritical commitment to beliefs and practices, and 
of critique as commitment to nothing but critical reason itself. Critical traditionalism 
rests, however, on the understanding that criticism is never the application of 
abstract universal reason but is necessarily performed from within, from a point of 
view anchored in tradition (whether it is aware of that fact or not). Tradition, for its 
part, is paralyzed or disconnected from the actual world if it is not open to criticism 
at the same time it is being taught and passed on. While some version of critical 
traditionalism may be ascribed to both Arendt and Alexander, I believe a much richer 
view is generated when they dialogue, with each shedding light on and helping 
overcome problems in the other. 
To illustrate this approach, I will briefly compare it to two prevailing approaches 
in education: liberal and multicultural education. Liberal education rests on each 
person’s ability to use their reason and promotes rational autonomy. As clarified 
by Eamonn Callan (1988), the most influential representative of this view in 
contemporary philosophy of education, such education distances itself from any 
partiality and seeks political neutrality, locating its contribution to democracy on 
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two levels: providing the knowledge needed for civic life, and fostering autonomous 
personalities able to judge and decide for themselves. This version of liberalism is 
clearly individualistic, as it emphasizes the student’s own intellectual capabilities, 
arguing that proper education will allow her not to yield to arbitrary powers but rather 
to mindfully choose her own views and actions, and take active part in democratic 
political life. Critical traditionalism also takes introducing the students to the political 
world to be one of its major roles, and it too emphasizes the development of the 
student’s moral and political autonomy. However, according to that approach, 
becoming acquainted with the world means much more than learning civic rights 
and duties or intellectually understanding the foundations of democratic government 
– it means rather growing into a rich tradition that provides communal belonging and 
common sense as a basis for personal identity and critical engagement. Autonomy, 
therefore, does not rest on abstract rational capacities but rather on a place within 
tradition and in relation to authority. Autonomy is the ability to criticize authority while 
respecting it, of being tied to tradition while appealing to other traditions as sources 
for expanding one’s horizons and possibilities for self-fulfillment. The contents and 
meaning of the individual’s intellectual capacities, therefore, are derived from the 
community and its tradition; in fact, individual liberalism is itself but a specific political 
and intellectual tradition. 
The emphasis on belonging to a specific tradition and community as the root 
necessary for growth is also characteristic of multicultural education. Unlike liberal, 
individualistic education, multicultural education acknowledges that the individual is 
always part of a community and tradition, and seeks to prevent situations where the 
student’s communal or cultural belonging impinges on her school performance or 
is threatened by the dominant culture. Such education is based on each student’s 
need to be a member of some community, and on the community’s right to live 
alongside others without being assimilated into the majority culture (Kincheloe & 
Steinberg, 1997; Levinson, 2009). This approach may come down to giving room to 
various identities and voices within a mixed classroom, or to defending the right for 
separate communal education that ensures continuity of tradition and empowers the 
individual by drawing meaning and identity from the community. 
Critical traditionalism also acknowledges the right of every group to educate 
the next generation in light of its unique tradition, but rejects the extreme relativism 
implied by multiculturalism, namely the assumption that each culture is a closed 
totality that cannot be criticized using the conceptual tools of another. The point 
here is not only the paradoxality inherent in every extreme relativist view, which 
has to apply its skepticism to itself (RLE, p. 56). From the point of view of critical 
traditionalism, the major problem of multicultural education is its emphasis on 
preserving and strengthening culture and tradition at the expense of criticizing and 
changing it. Without denying the power students can draw from standing firm in their 
own traditions, critical traditionalism puts much more weight on the criticism each 
student may have of her own culture and tradition, as well as on intercultural dialogue 
that enables each culture to renew itself and individuals to find their place in the 
world by adopting a critical perspective. In the words of Kimberley Curtis, education 
seeking to preserve the pluralist spirit of multiculturalism while avoiding relativism and 
separatism «makes our world more vividly, more actively held in common» (2001, p. 
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131). Such education rejects both the status quo and multicultural separatism, and 
by using cultural differences as resources rather than a problem, looks at the world 
from ever more perspectives, thereby enriching the world itself (Lane, 2001). 
6. Afterword
The dialogue between Arendt and Alexander I have suggested offers an 
alternative to the current educational discourse by rejecting the view from nowhere 
and anchoring education in tradition and authority. However, this alternative is not 
problem free either. Arendt and Alexander also share some blind spots, naturally 
reflected in the approach developed here by combining their positions. Instead of 
repeating all of the above, I will end by pointing to one important issue that seems 
to escape both: the importance of power relations in appropriating tradition and in 
taking a hold in the common world.
Simone de Beauvoir wrote in The Second Sex that:
To regard the universe as one’s own […] one must belong to the caste of 
the privileged; it is for those alone who are in command to justify the universe 
by changing it, by thinking about it, by revealing it; they alone can recognize 
themselves in it and endeavour to make their mark upon it (1956, p. 671). 
Taking one’s part in the world and belonging to tradition are thus not neutral 
processes occurring in the same way in everybody or varying only according to 
personal differences. They are influenced by power relations within each group and 
in relation to any tradition – no world is equally shared by all. Alexander is indeed 
aware of such relations between different communities, and as argued above, this 
view can be consistent with Arendt. However, my point now has to do with relations 
of oppression and domination within each culture and tradition, as is arguably the 
case with women in Orthodox Judaism and slaves in Roman antiquity. Internal 
critique through dialogue with the past and its representatives in the present will 
not suffice here, for one of the obvious implications of internal power relations is 
that some voices are not sufficiently heard in each culture because tradition itself 
silences them. 
A way out of this conundrum, I believe, requires not only dialogue but also 
struggle. Such struggle may be integrated into the critical traditionalism developed 
here, but this would require turning our gaze away from Arendt and Alexander; it will 
require engaging them in further dialogue with political and educational theorists 
whose account of political struggle is characterized by the depth and sensibility of 
Arendt’s discussion of authority and by Alexander’s discussion of the pedagogy of 
difference.
7. References
Alexander, H.A. (2001). Reclaiming Goodness: Education and the Spiritual Quest. 
Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
38
Itay Snir
Foro de Educación, v. 16, n. 24, enero-junio / january-june 2018, pp. 21-40.
e-ISSN: 1698-7802
Alexander, H.A. (2015). Reimagining Liberal Education: Affiliation and Inquiry in 
Democratic Schooling. London: Bloomsbury.
Alexander, H.A. (2017). What is Critical about Critical Pedagogy? Conflicting 
Conceptions of Criticism in the Curriculum. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 
1-14.
Arendt, H. (1998). The Human Condition. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Arendt, H. (2005a). The Tradition of Political Thought. In The Promise of Politics (pp. 
40-62). New York: Schocken. 
Arendt, H. (2005b). The End of Tradition. In The Promise of Politics (pp. 81-92). New 
York: Schocken. 
Arendt, H. (2005c). Reflections on Little Rock. In Responsibility and Judgment (pp. 
193-213). New York: Schocken.
Arendt, H. (2006a). Tradition and the Modern age. In Between Past and Future (pp. 
17-40). London: Penguin Classics.
Arendt, H. (2006b). What is Authority?. In Between Past and Future (pp. 91-141). 
London: Penguin Classics.
Arendt, H. (2006c). The Crisis in Education. In Between Past and Future (pp. 170-
193). London: Penguin Classics.
de Beauvoir, S. (1956). The Second Sex. London: Jonathan Cape.
Biesta, G. (2010). How to Exist Politically and Learn From It: Hannah Arendt and the 
Problem of Democratic Education. Teachers College Record, 112(2), 556-575.
Buber, M. (1996). I and Thou. New York: Touchstone.
Callan, E. (1985). McLaughlin on Parental Rights. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 
19(1), 111-118.
Callan, E. (1988). Autonomy and Schooling. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press. 
Curtis, K. (2001). Multicultural Education and Arendtian Conservatism: On Memory, 
Historical Injury, and Our Sense of the Common. In Gordon, M. (Ed.), Hannah 
Arendt and Education (pp. 127-152). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
Dewey, J. (1997). Experience and Education. New York: Touchstone. 
Dorff, E. (1996). Conservative Judaism: Our ancestors to our descendants. New 
York: United Synagogue of America.
Freire, P. (1996). Pedagogy of the Oppressed. London: Penguin. 
Fröbel, F. (2005). The Education of Man. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.
39
Tradition, authority and dialogue: Arendt and Alexander on education
Foro de Educación, v. 16, n. 24, enero-junio / january-june 2018, pp. 21-40.
e-ISSN: 1698-7802
Gordon, M. (2001). Hannah Arendt on Authority: Conservatism in Education 
Reconsidered. In Gordon, M. (ed.), Hannah Arendt and Education (pp. 37-66). 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
Higgins, C. (2010). Education, Crisis and the Human Condition: Arendt after 50 
Years. Teachers College Record, 112(2), 375-385.
Husserl, E. (1977). Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Kincheloe, J.L., & Steinberg, S.R. (1997). Changing Multiculturalism: New Times, 
New Curriculum. Buckingham: The Open University Press.
Lane, A. (2001). Is Hannah Arendt a Multiculturalist?. In Gordon, M. (Ed.), Hannah 
Arendt and Education (pp. 153-174). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
Levinson, N. (2001). The Paradox of Natality: Teaching in the Midst of Belatedness. In 
Gordon, M. (ed.), Hannah Arendt and Education (pp. 11-36). Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press. 
Levinson, M. (2009). Mapping Multicultural Education. In Siegel, H. (Ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophy of Education (pp. 428-450). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press.
Nagel, T. (1986). The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Noddings, N. (2002). Educating Moral People: A Caring Alternative to Character 
Education. New York: Teachers College Press.
 Pestalozzi, J.H. (2007). How Gertrude Teaches Her Children. Whitefish, MT: 
Kessinger Publishing LLC.
Popper, K. (1992). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Routledge.
Rawidowicz, S. (1957). On Interpretation. In Proceedings of the American Academy 
for Jewish Religion, Research 26 (pp. 83-126). American Academy for Jewish 
Research. 
Sacks, J. (2003). The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations. 
London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Sandel, M. (1998). Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Schutz, A. (2001). Is Political Education an Oxymoron? Hannah Arendt’s Resistance 
to Public Spaces in School. In Rice, S. (Ed.), Philosophy of Education (pp. 324-
332). Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society.
40
Itay Snir
Foro de Educación, v. 16, n. 24, enero-junio / january-june 2018, pp. 21-40.
e-ISSN: 1698-7802
Schutz, A., & Sandy, M.G. (2015). Friendship and the Public Stage: Revisiting 
Hannah Arendt’s Resistance to ‘Political Education’. Educational Theory, 65(1), 
21-38.
Snir, I. (2015). Bringing Plurality Together: Common Sense, Thinking and Philosophy 
in Arendt. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 53(3), 362-384.
Snir, I. (2016). Re-politicizing the Scholastic: School and Schoolchildren between 
Politicization and De-politicization. Ethics and Education, 11(2), 117-130.
Taylor, C. (1992). Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press.
